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AIR TRANSPORT OBSOLESCENCE*
HERBERT

E.

DOUGALL'

AND NEWTON

K.

WILSONt

The aviation industry presents a situation which might at
first glance be considered paradoxical. Here is an industry, only
an "infant" in the field of transportation, which is threatened with
bankruptcy unless some measures can be taken to improve its
earning power. Yet at the same time its managers are engaged
in a race for supremacy in speed, a race which involves the design,
purchase and operation of expensive new. equipment. For the air
industry as a whole, new and improved equipment must constantly
be introduced to win over the travelling public to the !air, a public
now almost convinced of the safety of air transport, but avid for
more speed. For individual competing air lines, new equipment is
necessary to keep in the race at all, even though on an earnings
basis investment in it is not justified.. This double competitive
situation makes of primary importance the problem of the cost of
replacing equipment before the investment in it has been reproduced in earnings; that is the problem of obsolescence.
Suicidal competition, emphasized by heavy cost of obsolescence, means the death of capital' already invested, and the impossibility of attracting new capital.1 More than this, it means the
slowing down of progress in transportation technique and service,
a result of enormous social and economic consequences. It is the
hope of government that air transport will become self-sufficient.
It is obviously the hope of the owners and managers of air companies that an adequate return will be made on investment. It is
the hope and the need of the public that air transport will fulfill
*This article Is based upon materials included in a thesis submitted by Mr.
Wilson in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of M.B.A., in
Northwestern University School of Commerce.
tAssoclate Professor of Economics and Finance, Northwestern University
(in charge of courses in Transportation, Evanston Campus).
tCandidate for the degree of M.B.A., Northwestern University Graduate
School.
1. "The total of original privately financed investment in the aeronautical
industries, almost all of it put in between 1927 and 1929, appears to have been
some $550,000,000. To that, we have added another $90,000,000, for the investment in municipal airports. Much of the investment was disastrously reckless.
Much of it has disappeared by the attrition of depression. There remains some
$180,000,000 of current value in commercial activities:" Report of the Federal
Aviation Commission (January, 1935), pp. 2-3.
"In the financial figures submitted by the air lines to the Interstate Commerce Commission, 26 out of 32 domestic contracts then in force showed a net
loss for October. In one case the loss on a single contract amounted to almost
$49,000 for the month. The total net loss of all operators, considering the
:
whole domestic transport system as a unit, were reported as $307,000....
Report, p. 46.
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its promise of safe, fast and economical transportation. But unless
the problem of wasting capital is clearly understood and definitely
dealt with, none of these hopes is likely to be fulfilled.
Obsolescence, that premature loss of value of property that
becomes out of date before it wears out, as a result of improvenients and later models, is of peculiar significance in the air industry, an industry characterized by very rapid changes in technique. Under present conditions obsolescence may very well be one
of the most significant reasons why the industry is on the verge of
financial collapse. It is an operating cost of such significance that
it must be properly accounted for and controlled, if the industry is
to survive, grow, attract new capital, and play its part in economic
progress.
The authors have singled out the factor of obsolescence in the
air industry, and presented an analysis of it under four main headings. The first 'two, considered in this installment, involve the
questions:
(1) What is obsolescence? and (2) what is its
peculiar significance in the air industry? The last two, to be
treated in a second installment, involve two further questions:
(1) How is and how should obsolescence be accounted for in the
air industry? and (2) what should be done about the problem?
I.

WHAT Is OBSOLESCENCE?

While particular definitions and concepts of obsolescence vary
considerably, the nature of obsolescence as an "economic" rather
than a "physical" loss is, of course, well understood.2 Advances
in the arts and sciences produce new equipment and devices which,
particularly in a competitive situation, must be adopted by operators
who are to keep their place in the sun; and obsolescence, which
measures the value of property not consumed in operations and
which is lost due to premature retirement, is. the result. Equipment-is purchased on the premise that it possesses a certain potential ability to produce, over its natural physical life, services which
2.

The following are definitions of obsolescence from recognized authori-

ties:
value decline due to the fact that a certain type of equipment has
been rendered out of date by new inventions and improvements, . . . :- W. A.

Paton & 1. A. Stevenson, Principles of Accounting (Macmillan, 1918), p. 106.
o . . that lessening In worth which is brought about by the development
of something new whereby production becomes more economical or is changed
to meet new ideas, fads, or fancies of the consumer:" R?. B. Kester, Accounting Theory and Practice (Ronald Press, 1919), Vol. II, p. 127.
"Obsolescence is a premature loss of value in equipment that becomes out
of date before it wears out, because of inventions and improvement in design
of later models. It is taken into account only by highly developed enterprises
that realize the need from taking advantage of constant progress of invention
and are willing to scrap machinery before it is worn out:" H. G. Guthmann,
The Analysis of Financial Statements (Prentice Hall, 1932). p. 84.
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are worth more than they cost. Service value is shown on the
books as the book cost less depreciation proper. Profits on the use
of the property may cease before the end of the "natural life" of
the property, leading to the retirement of the property with a loss
of service value. Obsolescence accounts for this loss.
Notwithstanding the recognition of the fact of obsolescence,
the use of the term has been surrounded with much confusion.
This confusion arises mainly out of the including of obsolescence
as a form of "depreciation." Obsolescence is regarded as one of
the causes of depreciation by accountants and by the industry as
a whole." Income tax law and practice treat obsolescence as a
definite factor of depreciation. The Revenue Act of 1934 lists
tinder deductions from income "a reasonable allowance for exhaustion, wear and tear on property used in trade or business,
including a reasonable allowance for obsolescence."'4 In the Uniform System of Accounts for Carriers by Air, depreciation proper
and obsolescence are included in the same account.'
Obsolescence is, of course, an "economic" or functional cost,
whereas depreciation (deterioration) is a "physical" cost. Depreciation proper is the consumption of investment in property, or
the loss in the service capacity of property, due to use, wear and
tear, physical deterioration and the action of the elements. Briefly,
it results from the physical forces and conditions which limit the
service life of property and cause its retirement."
There are, clearly, several distinctions to -be made between
obsolescence. and depreciation (in the narrow sense). As to
purpose: the purpose of a depreciation charge is to measure'the
consumption of property, whereas obsolescence takes account of
the loss of. service value of property. As to causes: the causes
S. Definitions of depreciation which include obsolescence are as follows:
"Depreciation . . . is a decline in the value of property which is certain
to occur as a result of wear and tear and gradual obsolescence:" R. H. Montgomery. Auditing Theory and Practice (Ronald Press Co., 1922), Vol. I, p. 637.
"The loss of value, whether tangible or intangible in form, resulting from
physical decay or from obsolescence or inadequacy, which indicate functional
decay, is known as depreciation:" E. E. Saliers, Principles of Depreciation
(Ronald Press Co., 1915), p. 28.
4. Internal Revenue Act, 1934. See. 23(1).
5. "By the term 'depreciation' is meant the losses, either temporary or
permanent, suffered through current lessening in service value of tangible physical property due to wear and tear from operation and the action of time and
the elements which are not replaced by current repairs, as well as those ordinary losses in capacity for use or service sustained by physical property from
obsolescence or inadequacy due either to age, physical change, or supercession
resulting from new inventions, discoveries, change in popular demand, or requirements of public authority:" Uniform System of Accounts for Carriers by
Air (U. S. Post Office Department, July 1, 1930), p. 14.
6. "Some accountants use the word depreciation to include physical deterioration only: others use it. in a broader sense, to include both inevitable
and contingent losses . . . the word depreciation should be used only in the
sense of inevitable physical deterioration:" H. A. Finney, Principles of Accounting (Prentice Hall. 1934), Vol. I,pp. 268-9.
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of obsolescence cannot be controlled, are not easily predicted, and
usually happen without warning, whereas the causes of depreciation are controllable to a degree, are more easily predicted, and
accrue over a period of time. 7 As to effect: the effect of obsolescence is an economic loss whereas the effect of depreciation is a
transformation of equipment into serviceable values.
While different in nature, depreciation 'and obsolescence must
be considered together, for computation of depreciation charges is
essential in ascertaining obsolescence costs on a scientific basis.
Suppose a plane costing $12,000 has a natural physical life of
eight years, but its 'actual service life is two years. Depreciation
on a straight line method would write off $3,000 during the two
years. The obsolescence cost, assuming no salvage value for the
plane, would be $9,000.8
Before leaving the subject of the general nature of obsolescence, a few observations on the characteristics of obsolescence
may be in order. Obsolescence should not be regarded :as entirely
evil. It may be socially desirable (judged by standards of safety
and economy). It may be welcomed by a whole industry if it
affords advantages over a competitive industry, though units of the
industry may or may not welcome progress depending on their own
individual situation. Also, property may be obsolete in one capacity
and not in another, and may be a greater burden in one unit than
anotherf Ordinarily, losses are not shared equally in an industry
where competition exists. Any new property which affords an
advantage of one unit over the others will soon cause the new
7. The causes of obsolescence may be summarized as: (1) advances in the
arts, resulting from research, engineering and economic developments [the appearance of the Ford tr-motored all-metal plane in 1929 forced wholesale replacement of equipment]; (2) inadequacy of equipment to produce service required by a given demand [the "war-surplus" equipment proved inadequate for
mail carriage when commercial contracts were granted in 1926. It was therefore necessary to develop adequate load carriers such as the first Boeing] ; (3)
changes in consumers' standards of style, speed and comfort, etc. [the public
demanded tri-motored equipment soon after it appeared] ; (4) requirements of
public authority [the policy established under the McNary-Watres Act of 1930
required mail carriers to provide passenger facilities. Mail carrying equipment thus became obsolete].
It is obviously scarcely possible for management to control these causes,
whereas depreciation proper can be controlled to a certain extent at least,
through maintenance. Obsolescence Is difficult to account for in advance (for
this reason separate reserves for obsolescence are rarely found), although in
any new industry, and in periods characterized by new inventions and ideas.
obsolescence can be continually expected. Furthermore, obsolescence and depreciation proper do not occur in the same manner in relation to time. Depreciation or consumption of property commences from the moment the property is put into use and continues over Its life, whereas obsolescence losses may
not commence when the property is first put into use, and may occur almost
within a moment's notice.
8. This does not represent the method that has been used In practice in
accounting for obsolescence and depreciation. The practice has been to write
off the value of the plane in equal amounts over a three-year period.
9. A plane may become obsolete as a transcontinental passenger carrier,
where competition must be met, but will not necessarily be obsolete on a
"feeder" line or in the capacity of an express or mail carrier where no competition exists.
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property to be purchased by the remaining units. The greatest
loss will fall upon the units that possess relatively new property,
whereas those units which are standing ready to make changes
will not assume any great loss.
II.

PECULIAR

SIGNIFICANCE
AIR

OF

TRANSPORT

OBSOLESCENCE

IN

THE

INDUSTRY

Obsolescence costs appear to be especially significant in any
industry when a certain combination of circumstances prevails,'
that is, when the industry is highly competitive, when it is in the
development stage, and when it is hard pressed for earnings.
Replacement of equipment before it has reached the end of its
service life is obviously more likely to be necessary under competition than under monopoly conditions, although even a monopoly
may be forced to replace for reasons cited previously. 10 In the
developmental stage, replacements are likely to come faster than
during successive stages in the life of industry. And the fight
for earnings, either between limits of the same industry or between
industries, makes replacement losses heavier, since drastic efforts
must be made to retain or regain custom.
All these conditions prevail in the air transport industry today.
How the problem of obsolescence developed, what there is about
air transport that emphasizes the problem, and why it is particularly significant at the present time, are topics to which attention
will now be turned.
During the period of government operation of the air mail
(1918-1925), obsolescence was obviously not a problem, since "warsurplus" equipment was used and no important innovations appeared. During the years 1925-1930, when private contract carriage of mail under the original Air Mail Act was developed, the
carriers were reimbursed by the Government, at first on the basis
of percentage of revenue received, and later (after June 3, 1926) on
a poundage basis, and while both carriers and Government experienced a loss from the air mail traffic, "by the end of 1927 it was
apparent that the service could be continued indefinitely on the
basis of existing contract rates and with the existing level of
postage rates."'" The problem of obsolescence during the re10. See footnote 7. The monopolist may, however, be able to pass on much
or all of the cost of obsolescence, depending on the elasticity of demand for his
product.
11. Paul T. David. The Economics of Air Mail Transportation (Brookings
Inst., 1934), p. 74.
Most of the contracts were obtained at about $3.00 per pound; air mail rates
were reduced to 10c per half-ounce on Feb. 1, 1927. and to 5c for the first ounce
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mainder of this period was not an important management or
financial consideration. It was almost entirely an emergency responsibility. There was an abundance of private capital with which
the experiments could be financed. In addition to the effect of
general prosperity, the public enthusiasm for the air caused the
industry to be literally flooded with capital, and management was
neither forced to finance with senior capital nor to produce profits
sufficient to attract further investment. Mail contracts were sufficiently profitable to allow air transport carriers to purchase the
12
improved planes as they appeared.
The Watres Act of 1930 introduced significant changes, including the outlining of a nation-wide air system, addition of new
mail routes, and a new method of determining mail compensation,
based on space. A new era of competition was ushered in, for air
mail carriers were required to provide passenger service. Annual
changes in equipment were necessary, with speed emphasized as
the main prerequisite. Each time a faster plane was introduced by
one of the air transport companies, the equipment of the competitor became obsolete. In one case a fleet of planes was obsolete
before it was actually put into service. 13 Management had to provide speed regardless of cost. Even so, from 1930 to 1934, in
spite of the fact that the airlines, overdeveloped and overcapitalized, were not earning an adequate return, the changes in equipment were primarily engineering rather than financial problems. 14
Nor were they an important accounting problem, for the uniform
system of accounts prescribed by the Post Office Department provided for allowances for obsolescence.1 5
But from the cancellation of air mail contracts in February,
1934, and following the Black-McKellar Act of June, 1934, obsolescence has become a really significant managerial problem. With
Government subsidy eliminated, compensation for mail carriage
lowered, :and competition heightened by the introduction of more
mail routes, the carriers are now faced with the problem of proand lOc for each additional ounce on Aug. 1, 1928 (subsequently to 6c per
ounce In 1934).
12. The May, 1928, amendment to the Air Mail Act provided for the granting of route certificates by the Postmaster General up to ten years. These
permitted a breaking away from reliance upon competitive bidding for routes
once awarded. "The decision gave the air mail carriers an assured future. ...
The more forward-looking and public-spirited of the mail carriers used their
opportunity to carry on important technical development work:" Paul T. David,
cit. note 11, p. 81.
13. The Boeing "Monomail," United Airlines ship, 1932.
14. That the Government was bearing the lion's share of the cost of air
mail carriage is indicated by the fact that from 1930 to 1933 inclusive (years
ending June 30), the payments to the carriers were $70.9 millions, whereas the
revenue received for air mail was only $23.6 millions: Paul T. David, cit. note
11, p. 159.
15. Mandatory after July 1, 1930.
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viding for obsolescence from operating revenues. It is significant
to note that in the air transport industry, while capital investment
was privately over-stimulated, the problems of competition, including obsolescence, have resulted primarily from Government
encouragement of the over-expansion of services to proportions
where the industry can deliver a much greater volume of services
than demand warrants. The carriers had no choice but to make
bids, in 1934, which were below "out-of-pocket" expenses, for then
original investment could not be discarded. The bids for the new
contracts in essence "spoiled the market;" several new companies
were organized and received mail contracts. The larger companies'
lost numerous important contracts. New short and long routes
appeared, including a transcontinental route. Almost all the companies undertook to provide air mail, passenger, 'and express services, and strenuous competition for passenger traffic has developed,
not only between the air carriers directly, but between air and
rail .16

Competition, which makes the problem of obsolescence particularly acute, has 'a tendency to become cut-throat in the transportation field, unless voluntary cooperative efforts are undertaken
by the members of the industry, or unless Government regulation
intervenes.17 The reasons for this tendency may be grouped in a
three-fold classification. In the first place, cut-throat competition
appears to be the natural outcome in industries that employ large
fixed capital of a specialized nature, and hence are subject to the
problem of unused capacity. Air transportation, unlike other industries, has not enjoyed large operating profits, and the low
returns earned on :alarge investment have quickened the ruinous
forces of competition.' 8 (However, the problem of finding a return
on a huge fixed investment is not nearly as acute as in the railway
field, for the air companies do not have substantial investments in
rights of way.)
More significant as a reason for cut-throat competition in the
air transport field is the existence of joint costs. Air transport
companies provide mail, passenger and other services in the same
planes and through the same facilities, and it is not possible to
allocate :all costs to each of these services. Some of the costs,
16.

Primarily through faster and safer equipment.

But so far, direct com-

petition Is largely an individualistic fight for the supremacy of the market that
already exists.

This makes it

especially vicious.

17. This tendency is amply illustrated In the railway field, where It has
been the subject of prolonged study, controversy and legislative action.
18. It has been estimated that there has been a return of less than 1% on
the capital Investment: "U. S. Aviation and the Air Mail." Fortune (May. 1934),

p. 87.
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including obsolescence, should be covered by the combined services,
but accounting for the share of the cost each service should bear
is well-nigh impossible. 19 As a result, competition encourages the
quoting of rates on the basis of what the traffic will bear rather
than on a cost basis. More than this, in bidding for any one service, individual companies may seek to cover only net-out-of-pocket
expenses, thereby eliminating the advantages of obtaining from the
service even the total revenue which the traffic will bear.
As a corollary of the above traits, and growing out of them,
a third characteristic, that of increasing returns, is significant in
the air transport industry; this characteristic, like the others, helps
to explain why competition tends to become cut-throat, and, in
turn, why obsolescence costs are magnified in significance. An
increase in the volume of traffic does not involve a proportionate
increase in the cost of transportation as long as the equipment is
not fully utilized. Thus the tendency to cut rates, add to or improve equipment, or otherwise encourage traffic is nearly always
present. This characteristic of increasing returns may be the most
significant factor causing obsolescence and merits special attention.
The costs which do not vary in proportion to the change in
volume of traffic include both fixed charges ° (not of primary importance in air transport) and operating expenses, of which less
than half are variable, that is, vary in proportion to traffic. The
result is that the air transport executive feels a distinct pressure
to secure more traffic even at some concession. 2 1 If the new traffic
is "already on the air," cut-throat competition is further stimulated,
since the company losing the traffic, itself subject to large constant
costs, will not calmly submit to the loss of its business, and will
probably meet the competition with new and faster equipment.
19. See Paul T. David, cit. note 11, pp. 164-5.
20. Assuming no increase in capital investment.
21. The following tabulation, compiled from data of all air operators for
the year 1932, purports to show the tendency to increasing returns arising out
of the behavior of costs over a short period and up to the point of complete
utilization of equipment. It does not include any return on invested capital.
EXPENSE ITEMS

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
S.
9.
10.

PER CENT OF TOTAL EXPENSES
Constant
Variable
Total

Repairs and Maintenance ............
4.0%
Depreciatiod and Obsolescence ....... 15.0
Flying Personnel ....................
9.4
Fuel and Oil ............................
Traffic and Advertising ............... 7.0
Insurance ..........................
4.9
General Expense and Salaries .........
7.0
Airway Communications ..............
2.5
Taxes ..............................
1.3
All Other ...........................
5.0
Totals

.......................... 56.1%

16.5%
6.5
4.1
11.0
....
1.6
....
....
1.2
4.0

20.5%
20.5
13.5
11.0
7.0
6.5
7.0
2.5
2.5
9.0

43.9%

100.0%
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Thus the cycle continues, until earnings may fall so low that there
is not a return on capital for anyone.
Turning from the theoretical to the practical, let us examine
some applications of the characteristic of increasing returns. Air
transport is a seasonal industry, especially with respect to passenger
traffic. The yearly peak or maximum demand for passenger service occurs typically in July and August. Traffic during the dull
time (January and February) runs about 40% of the peak. Mail
and express services are less seasonal; the former's low is about
80% of the peak.2 2 Moreover, in both passenger and mail, there
are weekly fluctuations.

2

With these illustrations of the fact of unused capacity in mind,
it is easy to understand why efforts are made to obtain additional
off-peak business at anything over and above differential costs, so
that discriminatory rates appear, competition is stimulated, and the
problem of obsolescence is heightened both directly, through the
efforts of the carriers to attract off-peak business, and indirectly,
by increasing the relative burden of its cost to the carriers.
At the present time, with the air transport industry facing
bankruptcy, 24 the problem of obsolescence looms up with special

significance. It is a problem which must be dealt with if the industry is to survive, at least under private operation.
The second installment of this article will deal with the more
practical aspects of the problem of obsolescence in the air transport
industry; the discussion will center around two main questions:
how is and how should obsolescence be measured and accounted
for; and what steps should and may be taken to deal with the
problem.
(To be continued)
22. The load factors (ratio of average to maximum output) for the years
1931, 1932, and 1983, were 60%, 70%, and 69% for passenger traffic, 90%,
86%, and 89% for mali traffic, 68%, 84%, and 81% for express traffic, and
62%, 74%, and 72% for total traffic (computed from data In Aircraft Year
Book for 1934, page 520).
23. The experience of one operator may be typical. Starting Tuesday
morning, there is a gradual increase in passenger traffic until Saturday noon,
dropping to a low on Monday night. The mail traffic low occurs on Mondays,
with a small peak on Tuesdays and Wednesdays, a decline on Thursdays, and
another small peak on Fridays and Saturdays.
24. "It appears . . . that financial disaster Is In the making for a large
part of the present air transport system. Whether it makes its appearance in
six weeks or six months or longer, we cannot see how it can be postponed
indefinitely": Report of the Federal Aviation Commission, January, 1935, p. 46.

